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Abstract This article focuses on the transformation of
the female reproductive body with the use of assisted
reproduction technologies under neo-liberal economic
globalisation, wherein the ideology of trade without
borders is central, as well as under liberal feminist
ideals, wherein the right to self-determination is central.
Two aspects of the body in western medicine—the
fragmented body and the commodified body, and the
integral relation between these two—are highlighted.
This is done in order to analyse the implications of local
and global transactions in women’s reproductive body
parts for their right to self-determination and individual
agency and what this means for their embodiment. We
conclude by exploring whether women can become
embodied subjects by exercising their proprietary right
to their bodies through directing technology to achieve
their own goals, while at the same time being
fragmented into parts and losing their personhood and
bodily integrity.
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Introduction
In our post-modern times, developments in western
medical science as well as information and commu-
nication technologies have forced us to abandon as
obsolete the concept of the “natural” and “bounded”
human body, actualising what was earlier thought to
belong to the realm of science fiction alone. New
technological advancements have made far-reaching
interventions in the body possible, extending the
boundaries of a single body beyond its skin, tissues
and organs, so that we can even speak of post-human
bodies, not only in cyberspace and virtual reality, but
also in lived reality. Human beings have become an
assemblage of body parts, which are exchanged,
donated or traded. This development has raised new
questions, for instance, about the status of the body
and ownership of the body and its parts for bioethics,
law, and feminism.
Our specific focus here is on the transformation of
the female (potentially) “reproductive” body through
the use of assisted reproduction technologies (ARTs)
into a “productive” body, with marketable body parts.
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Originating in the West, in recent years these techno-
logies have proliferated under neo-liberal economic
globalisation, wherein the ideology of trade without
borders is central, as well as under liberal feminist
ideals, wherein the right to self-determination, choice
and autonomy are ideals to strive for. While being
globalised, these notions interact with local ideas
about the body and (self) identity in a given society
with varying conceptualisations in terms of claims
regarding ownership. We will explore the kinds of
interaction processes that take place. Our central
question thereby is: Are women “agents” (subjects) in
control over their own bodies and owners of its parts or
are they “victims” (objects) of the new technologies
and the actors and factors which drive their use?
Considering that there are cross-cultural differences
between women in their conceptualisations of selfhood
and control over their bodies and lives, contrasting
interpretations of the right to choose and self-determi-
nation are likely to emerge, particularly when it comes
to proprietary rights over bodies and their parts.
In order to address our question we deal first with the
role of biotechnology in fragmenting and commodifying
the female reproductive body. Thereafter, we look at the
(global) transactions in reproductive body parts—
whether in the form of donation or trade—and what
this means for women’s individual agency cross-
culturally. We use some examples from media reports
as well as from the Internet (a transnational transactional
space), in particular about practices in the United States
of America (USA) where commercial transactions in
reproductive body parts have become quite a common
phenomenon and are driving globalisation in this field.
Also, insights derived from empirical research in India by
the first author are used to understand the process. We
conclude by exploring whether women can become
embodied subjects by exercising their proprietary right to
their bodies through directing technology to achieve their
own goals, while at the same time being fragmented into
parts and losing their personhood and bodily integrity.
The Creation of New Bodies
through Biotechnology
The Fragmented and Fluid Body
With developments in biotechnology, the metaphor of
the body as a machine composed of parts, used in
biomedicine since the eighteenth century, is rein-
forced. What is new is the replaceability of “flawed”
body parts and their further objectification through
transplantation medicine and reproductive medicine.
In her formulation “organs without bodies”, Braidotti
(1989) refers to the discourse of biosciences, which, “in
taking the organism as its object, also takes the body as
a mosaic of detachable pieces”. Under the biotechno-
logical gaze which penetrates in three ways—x-rays
and ultrasound, steel (instruments), and chemistry (bio-
chemicals)—living organisms are reduced to an infin-
itesimal scale and lose all reference to the being as a
whole. The shift in reproductive medicine is in
intervening in the body from larger to smaller and yet
smaller parts of the body; viz. entities such as the belly,
uterus, eggs and embryos to microscopic parts—such
as cells, genes and DNA—and also from semen to
single sperm. Also, there is an objectification of the
body through visualisation technologies. The technolo-
gies for pre-natal screening, such as ultrasound, create a
division between the pregnant woman and the foetus,
often privileging the latter (Rothman 1986) There is an
increasing tendency to view women as wombs and
childbearing machines, instead of whole persons. This
attitude to women is particularly visible in the
application of ARTs.
Just as with developments in transplantation medi-
cine, with advances in reproductive medicine the
boundaries of the body, in terms of closures at the skin
and finiteness in terms of biological age, have been
stretched, resulting in the open, flexible, leaky, fluid and
unbounded body (Martin 1992; Shildrick 1997). While
earlier the physical relationships between one human
being and another were limited by relationships
between bodies enclosed by boundaries of skin, now,
relationships—real and virtual—are also through parts
of bodies and the range of body parts that can be related
is immense. “Our health and fertility are more likely to
be owed to the therapeutic effects of another’s frag-
ments....We in turn will be obliged to donate what
fragments we can afford” (Waldby 2002, 240). Such
fragments are generally treated as detachable things,
biological entities that are severed from social and
subjective identity once they are removed from a
particular body. New meanings of embodiment enabled
by the transfer of body parts, including reproductive
body parts, are being created. Matter from one body
introduced into another’s body as in organ, tissue or
reproductive body part transfer is a literal form of
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“intercorporeality” (Weiss 1999). According to Waldby
(op.cit. 245), Weiss’ notion of “intercorporeality”
suggests that the coherence of selfhood is constantly
risked, fractured and transformed by virtue of the fact of
being embodied in contemporary culture. It involves, a
“material confusion of bodies”, “a material indetermi-
nacy” (“destabilisation of the self”), while producing
relationality in terms of motherhood, fatherhood and
kinship, and as such new forms of identity. Sometimes
this relationality is based on ownership of the body or
its parts and exchange of the same as commodity.
The Commodified Body and the Body as Property
Commodification of the body is not something new.
Commodification of human corpses and body parts
procured from the living and dead has a long history.
Human material has value as trophies of war,
religious relics, and therapeutic materials, medicinal
and anatomical specimens (Sharp 2000; Lock 2001).
Late modernity is witness to further commodification
of the body within the medical market place. In
addition, the body as a source of raw material for
saleable products through the “human body shop” is
now accessible globally (Kimbrell 1993; Andrews
and Nelkin 1998).
In advanced capitalist societies commodification is
characterised by the removal of boundaries between
what can or cannot be bought and sold. Nowhere is this
more dramatically illustrated than in the current markets
for human organs, tissues and reproductive body parts to
cater to a medical business driven by supply and
demand. Economic relationships of various kinds are
introduced into the social patterns of human reproduc-
tion. Commodities are “freed” from a direct relationship
between producers and consumers; they are bought and
sold and thus they can circulate in broader, even global
networks. Within the emerging biotechnology industry
human bodies have become “biological capital” that is
deposited in bio (technology) banks (blood banks,
sperm banks, embryo banks, gene banks, tissue banks,
and cord blood banks) from which the public can draw.
Along with these developments new desires and needs,
new social ties and social contracts, and new con-
ceptions of justice and ethics are being created (Scheper-
Hughes 2000).
Property rights in reproductive material have led to
legal battles. Not only ownership of children that may
be born with the use of donor gametes, or through
surrogacy, but even that of eggs and embryos, sperm
and genes is sometimes publicly disputed. Law suits
over the status of these body parts after the death of
one parent or marital separation are fought out in
courts, increasing the need for legislation regarding
ownership and for legal interventions in specific
cases. In some countries reproduction is regulated by
contract law regarding ownership (property), patent-
ing and use of embryos, genes and cells, etc. In the
USA certain attorneys and law firms specialise
exclusively in what is called Family Formation Law
and Reproductive Law.
Discussions on commodification usually focus on
the rights of ownership and control of one’s body.
Property right over one’s body refers to two aspects—
others cannot appropriate parts of my body without
my consent, but also I have the right to sell all or parts
of my body. Another view is that I have no property
right on my body: I can’t alienate it, but it is a
“commons” to which others may lay claim. ARTs
raise questions such as: who owns the ova that are
used for stem cell research, and whose genetic
material is in the stem cell? Within stem cell research
and cloning the egg is devoid of its original nucleus,
then does it matter from whom the egg is derived?
These questions become even more pertinent when it
comes to discussions around the Human Genome
Project. Are ova, sperm, cells and genes “persons”,
who are to be accorded the same rights as persons, or
are they objects and thus to be treated as “things”?
What is also difficult is how to strictly define the
lines separating various modes of transactions—
donation, gift, altruism, and commerce—in body
parts. If this is the case for a country like the USA
where contract law is highly advanced, it is perhaps
even more so in countries where secular laws and ethics
concerning the use of reproductive technologies have
hardly been formulated and implemented. Notions of
women’s bodies and their parts as property may vary in
different socio-cultural contexts. While examining
possible modes of transactions in the following two
sections, these differences are taken into account.
Donation, Gift, Altruism or just Commerce?
Drawing on the work of Mauss (1954), an important
way of discussing the relations between individuals
and groups in a given society has been in terms of the
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opposition between “gift” and “commodity”, to
characterise two orders of social relations. This
opposition, however, has been critiqued as too simple.
Frow (1997), for instance, posits that there is no pure
type of either gift economy or commodity economy;
rather the two are intertwined in various hybrid
configurations. Gift and commodity are not mutually
exclusive modes of transaction, since they tend to
have in common certain forms of calculation, strategy
and motivation. Gifts are not mere objects, but
carriers of social bonds. Gift exchange establishes a
qualitative relationship between the giver and the
recipient, with the giver often acquiring some kind of
power from the act of giving. Frow (ibid. 125) cites
Gregory (1982) who argues that “a gift economy
depends upon the creation of debt, where what is at
stake is not the things themselves or the possibility of
material profit but the personal relationships that are
formed and perpetuated by ongoing indebtedness”
Cheal (1988), also cited in Frow (ibid.) contrasts the
short-term profits of the market economy to the long-
term interest in sustaining social solidarity that drives
the moral economy of interpersonal relationships.
Within the latter, the social significance of individuals
is defined by their obligations to others, with whom
they maintain continuing relationships.
The following examples illustrate that the labour
that goes into “the gift” is bought and paid for. Body
parts are, nowadays, one’s ultimate collateral—for
instance, individuals sell a kidney to pay for the
dowry of a daughter, male medical students “donate”
(rather sell) sperm, and female students in the US and
Spain sell their ova to pay their way through
university (Croon 2004), or a woman in India decides
to rent her womb to pay her invalid husband’s
medical bills. Commercial surrogacy (most developed
in the USA), but also increasingly on the rise in India,
has become another lucrative area to make money by
exploiting women’s bodies. These examples illustrate
that the labour that goes into “the gift” is bought and
paid for. Commercialism, however, can go hand in
hand with what is called “compensated gifting”, as
women seem to be acting out of a sense of altruism,
giving the precious “gift of life” to their unfortunate
“sisters” who cannot fulfill their desire for a child
otherwise.
In Indian society, where traditionally they have
been socialised to be self-sacrificing, and to do
everything to please others, “giving” seems to come
“naturally” to women. Also, there is a certain amount
of (moral) pressure on female relatives to volunteer as
donors, whether it is of kidneys or eggs. As observed
during the first author’s empirical research in IVF
clinics (Gupta 2006), most egg donors in India are
relatives, just as most adoptions are trans-family
adoptions. The donors are often younger sisters,
cousins and sometimes sisters-in-law. While the bond
between sisters is generally strong and harmonious in
Indian society, relations between sisters-in-law are
often tense. However, egg recipients were full of
praise and gratitude for the sister-in-law who had
volunteered to help out her husband’s unfortunate
sister. Donors, on the other hand, were happy that
their body could be used for someone’s benefit. Any
transaction of money, if it occurred, was never
mentioned by either donors or recipients to outsiders.
However, according to the guidelines issued by the
Indian Council of Medical Research in December
2004, egg donation among relatives or known friends
of either the husband or the wife is to be banned,
which is likely to increase trade in eggs and embryos.
However, these guidelines did not achieve the status
of legislation and both practices (donation and trade)
continue, with the latter increasing openly. Some
clinics also run egg-sharing (“donor-recipient”) pro-
grammes where anonymous egg donors receive some
compensation for their treatment costs from the
couple they have donated to, if both are undergoing
treatment under the same specialist who may bring
the two together, generally in an anonymous relation-
ship [ibid.]. Body parts can thus become the ultimate
“gift” linking various members of the family, reaf-
firming familial expectations and love and consoli-
dating relationships, or even creating new “family”
formations, as in non-related donor and recipient
dyads. Monetary compensation, if any, in the former
cases is often blurred for outsiders.
The notion of semen, eggs and embryos as
commodities is further confused by the fact that
recipients themselves perceive the donor as having
given them a precious “gift”, in the form of a
(potential) child which the women/couples happened
to have paid for. The significance of social relations
between the donor and recipient depend upon the fact
whether they are known to each other or not, and
whether the transaction is directly between the two
parties or mediated (often commercially) by an
outsider. Tober (2001) also questions whether any
Bioethical Inquiry
gift is driven by pure altruism. There is always some
form of self-interest among donors—even when the
gift is given freely and the donor remains anonymous;
personal satisfaction may be the motivation rather
than pure altruism. Egg donors in general feel
fortunate to have their own children and, therefore,
want to help infertile couples to experience that
happiness. It gives women a sense of achievement,
despite the physical discomfort. This is no different in
the USA, although, the transactions there take place
among unrelated donors and are explicitly commer-
cial in nature. Comments from unrelated egg donors
and surrogates found on the website Intendedparents.
com, a facilitating agency in California for indepen-
dent intended parents, surrogate mothers and egg
donors, illustrate their motives. Apparently for them
reciprocity and commercialisation can go well togeth-
er, as also argued above by Frow (op.cit.) and Tober
(op.cit.). Although, sometimes there seems to be a
thin line between an altruistic “gift” (i.e. donation)
and “commodity” (i.e. commerce), most transactions
in body parts can be characterised (also) as trade,
since exchange of money is involved, either directly
between the donor and recipient or through a service
provider/broker. The term “donation” is often a
misnomer for what is actually a market transaction;
it imbues it with a higher meaning. Besides, there is
also a growing commerce in human body parts and
substances.
Trade in Human Body Parts and Substances
As in transplantation medicine, advances in reproduc-
tive medicine have led to a lucrative trade in human
body parts. The rapid growth of global capitalism and
consumerism has created “new regimes of consump-
tion”. Bodies are seen as economic capital under
conditions of neo-liberal economic globalisation.
Scheper-Hughes (2001, 43) quotes George Soros
(1998) who ascertained that “by their nature markets
are indiscriminate, promiscuous and inclined to
reduce everything, including human beings and their
sexual and reproductive capacities to the status of
commodities, things that can be bought, sold, traded
and stolen.” In the market transactions of reproductive
body parts, biomedical research interests, business
interests and sometimes also consumer interests come
together. While the sale of solid organs is illegal in
most countries, semen, ova, blood and other body
fluids and tissues do not fall under the legislation
because of their regenerative quality. Also, trans-
actions in these body parts are relatively unregulated,
primarily due to the ideology of individual autonomy.
The examples in the following section serve to
illustrate, firstly, how women’s maternal bodies and
their products are expropriated and used within
capitalist patriarchal structures for profit-making, and
secondly, the role of the Internet in enabling (trans)
national transactions in body parts.
Body Fluids and Life forms as “Raw Materials”
for Industrial Production
In The Netherlands, an organisation called “Moeders
voor Moeders” (mothers for mothers), whose folders
can be found in all pharmacies, calls upon young
pregnant women to help their less fortunate sisters,
who have difficulty conceiving naturally. It collects
the urine of young pregnant women for ten weeks
between the sixth and sixteenth week of pregnancy.
This urine contains hCG—a hormone which earlier
could not be made synthetically. The Dutch multina-
tional AKZO-Pharma makes fertility hormones and
hCG pregnancy-test kits from this urine (Gupta 2000).
It is clear that women give away free a natural
resource that is at the basis of a product through
which AKZO makes huge profits.
The question is: To what extent do bodily
substances, tissues, secretions and organs, still belong
to the body, thus resorting under a person’s bodily
self-determination, and when do they start becoming
property capable of being transferred to new owners,
like hospitals?
With respect to bodily self-determination, for
example, it is obviously required that it be clear
what counts as self, and what as other, where the
boundaries of the individual body are drawn. In
contemporary reproductive technologies, how-
ever, it is precisely these boundaries that are at
stake and being redefined (van der Ploeg 1998,
58).
A placenta apparently belongs to the hospital, not
to the mother and child who cooperated in creating it.
Placentas are collected and delivered/sold to IVF
embryology labs. In the 1990s there was a controver-
sy regarding the sale of placenta by hospitals in
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England to Merieux, a cosmetics manufacturer. In
China women were recruited to donate foetuses. Brain
cells extracted from foetuses were being used to make
a preparation to treat Parkinson’s disease, in the belief
that stem cells of embryos are able to develop in the
brains of adults into dopamine producing cells,
whereby Parkinson’s disease can be slowed down.
People were willing to pay up to US $10,000 for such
a concoction (Kimbrell op.cit.).
An application was submitted to obtain a patent for
the characterisation of the gene sequence coding for
human relaxin, a hormone which is synthesised and
stored in female ovaries and helps in dilation, thus
facilitating the birth process. A substance that
naturally occurs in women’s bodies was thus being
treated as an ‘invention’ of three male scientists, Peter
John Hud, Hugh David Nill, and Geoffrey William
Tregear (Shiva 1994). There are reports of theft of ova
from Croatian and Iranian clinics sold to research
laboratories, and trade in eggs of Rumanian women to
clients in Israel, the UK and the USA (de Volkskrant
2005). Women in developing countries of the global
South or in the underdeveloped East European
countries are more vulnerable to commercialisation
of body materials, and even if provided compensa-
tion, they are likely to be paid much less than women
in the developed North and West. The Internet has
contributed immensely to the transnational trade in
body parts.
Internet and Trade in Body Parts
Centres trading in human gametes—sperm, eggs,
embryos—and surrogacy services can be found all
over the world, and mainly in the USA. GIVF
Cryobanks in Fairfax, Virginia, operating since 1986
offers wide facilities:
We are a full services cryobanking company,
providing donor sperm, cord blood and embryo
storage services as well as cryopreservation
services for cancer patients. Our facilities have
extensive experience shipping all over the world.
As a division of the Genetics & IVF Institute, the
world’s largest, fully integrated, specialised
provider of infertility treatment and genetics
services, GIVF Cryobanks is able to offer a
depth and breadth of services that other facilities
cannot match (www.GIVF.com).
Huntington Reproductive Center (HRC) in Southern
California proclaimed proudly that as a result of their
fertility treatments and highly trained physicians and
staff, several thousand babies had been born across the
USA and around the world. “In fact, we have HRC
babies living on all continents except Antarctica!”
(www.huntingtonreproductivecenter.com).
The Center for Surrogate Parenting and Egg
Donation Inc. in Beverley Hills (CSP) in California
(www.creatingfamilies.com) claims to have a world
wide reputation as being the leader in the field of
surrogacy. It claims further that there is no surrogacy
agency that has been in business longer than CSP
(operating since 1980); over the years CSP has been
referred to as the “gold standard of the industry” or
the “cadillac” of the industry, titles not self-pro-
claimed, but that were awarded to CSP. CSP offers
hundreds of potential egg donors to choose from with
the aid of photos and complete profiles regarding IQ
and other characteristics. Based on this information
couples can choose a donor and decide whether to
come in contact with the donor and continue the
acquaintance or not. At this centre eggs cost upwards
of US $6,000; donors receive US $2,500 a piece. Its
newsletter Intended Parents also carries articles by
egg donors and surrogates who describe their expe-
riences of having made a difference in someone else’s
life by having donated their eggs or acting as
surrogates to realise another couple’s dream. The
websites of some centres even provide advertising
space to individuals. Girls of Ivy League colleges in
the USA can extract a premium of as much as ten
times the market average for their eggs. Advertisers in
college papers offer up to US $50,000 for donors who
meet the most demanding and specific criteria. Some
centres, such as Ron’s Angels, specialise in the eggs
of fashion models, auctioning sperm and ova on their
website (Goldberg 1999).
In July 2003, “Baby Donors” (www.babydonors.
com), a company based in Amsterdam, claiming to be
the first in Europe, was advertising its services on its
website. It offered to act as an intermediary for the
sale of tailor-made personalised sperm insemination
and egg donor packages through the Internet. Sperm
banks exist for a long time, but since a number of
European countries, including The Netherlands,
changed the law which had guaranteed anonymity to
sperm donors, there is a shortage of sperm from
“local” donors. This has resulted in the rise of sperm
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banks in countries where anonymity is still provided
and their booming international operations [ibid.].
One of them is Cryos Sperm Bank, which is operating
since 1987 and claims to be the world’s largest
provider of donor sperm with its head office in
Aarhus, Denmark, with more than 200 donors
available and almost 10,000 units of semen distribut-
ed each year. On its website the company claims to
deliver sperm-related products to clinics or distrib-
utors in nearly 50 countries and donor semen to
clinics in more than 40 countries (www.cryossperm
bank.com). In India, most sperm donors are college
students who sell their sperm to earn some pocket
money (personal communication by the Director of
Cryogenie India, a sperm bank in New Delhi).
Cryogenie India, with its offices in New Delhi,
Bangalore, and Jalna, is the largest provider of sperm
preparation kits for intra-uterine insemination, and
semen banking services in India. Sperm donors are
paid US $40 in Denmark and US $500 in the USA
(Alvarez 2004) and as little as US $4–5 in India. The
fastest growing clientele for sperm banks in the West
are lesbian and single women choosing an anony-
mous donor, because known sperm donors often want
to have a say in the upbringing of the child. This
brings us to the question: What do these examples
regarding transactions in reproductive body parts
mean for the feminist ideal of women’s right to self-
determination with regard to their bodies, which
originally had a different connotation?
Women’s Bodies and the Right
to Self-Determination
During the second feminist wave in the West in the
1970s, women, with their demand for women’s right
to self-determination regarding reproductive deci-
sions, tried to wrest back control over their own
bodies and lives that for ages had been denied to them
by husbands, doctors, or the state. Initially, this
referred to the demand for contraception and abortion
as exemplified in the slogan—“women’s body is
women’s right”, or “baas in eigen buik” (“boss of
one’s own belly”), the slogan of the Dutch women’s
movement. However, since the 1980s liberal femi-
nism made ownership by women of their own bodies
the principal aim of women’s liberation.
In her contributions “My Body, My Property”
and “Feminist Perspectives on New Reproduc-
tive Technologies”, Andrews (1986, 1987, cited
in Mies (1988) widened the concept of “repro-
ductive choice” to include an individual’s choice
to become pregnant through IVF, artificial
insemination, or any other procedure. For
Andrews “reproductive autonomy” comprises
not only the option to use techniques like
cryopreservation of eggs, sperm or embryos,
but also the possibility of selling body parts to
third parties. She criticised the legal practice in
the USA that allowed people to donate their
body parts but not to sell them, while scientists
and doctors that experiment with body parts and
substances usually obtain them free from the
patients and often make great sums of money
from the products of these experiments. By
defining the human body as “property”, the
owner of the property could not only legally
prevent the misuse of these parts, but also claim
a share in the profits made by developing these
into marketable commodities. Is it not patron-
ising then to discourage or forbid women from
selling their ova?, asks Andrews.
Since the 1980s, women’s political struggles in the
domains of reproductive rights have made the
language of ’owning’ or ’controlling’ one’s bodies a
commonplace of feminist rhetoric.
But, this language has also been challenged, not
only by conservatives and religious fundamen-
talists on the right but from within feminism;
firstly on moral grounds by radical feminists, for
whom such language evokes patriarchal and
commercial practices of objectifying women’s
bodies, treating them as goods and second, on
analytical grounds, by postmodernists, for whom
such language rests on the illusion of agentic,
coherent, physically bounded selves, writes
Petchesky (1995, 387).
She argues that controversy over the “language of
property” in feminist theory starts from a narrow
premise that interprets property and ownership in
terms of a “Lockean paradigm”, of “property in one’s
person”, signifying individualism, instrumentalism
and a dualism between the body as commodity and
the “person” as “transactor” (388). This would by
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corollary imply that the body is a commodity we own
and thus we are free to sell our body parts or sexual
and reproductive services in the marketplace. For
instance, women can also use the body as property
metaphor under the capitalist juridical system to assert
their own autonomy over it, without interference. This
is the case with egg-selling and commercial surrogacy
in the USA. Using the “property in the person”
argument, Dickenson (1997) affirms the liberatory
potential of surrogacy, and therefore, sees prohibition
of surrogacy contracts as limiting women’s capacity
to be treated as self-owning subjects of property,
holding property in their bodies and reproductive
capacities.
There remains uneasiness about using property
notions to discuss human beings. Commenting on
Andrews’ position, Mies (op.cit.) points to the notions
of rights and personhood in post-industrial societies,
and biotechnology that have made “individuals” into
“dividuals” and “reproducible fragments”. Western
capital associated with the patriarchal project of
science and technology has turned everything, includ-
ing people, into resources for appropriation. The
female body with its generative power has been
discovered as a new “area of investment” to overcome
the “growth” problem of industrial capitalism. Under
patriarchal capitalism women are seen as property and
their bodies are owned by others, implying an
alienation of women from their own bodies. This
brings us to our main question regarding women’s
subjectivity and agency in processes and transactions
within which their bodies are treated as objects.
Women: Agents, Victims, or Both?
The international women’s movement has been
divided in its response to ARTs and how far women
are really free to choose. In some countries as in
Israel, the pro-natalist ideology of compulsory moth-
erhood makes reproduction a “national mission”,
while in others, like China and India, anti-natalist
population policies influence reproductive decisions
to limit the number of children to one or two in order
to meet population control agendas. The help-seeking
behavior of involuntary childless women is to be seen
within the cultural constraints of femininity/mother-
hood, low self-esteem and gender power asymmetries.
When confronted with their own or husband’s
infertility/sub-fertility, women seek ARTs to realise
their desire for a child and to overcome stigmatisa-
tion, a sense of loss and self-esteem (Gupta 2000).
Fertility and motherhood (even more than father-
hood) are irrevocably linked with cultural notions
about womanhood; this is more so in some cultures
than in others. For many Indian women who often
lack power from other sources, their reproductive
capacity is an important source of power as biological
motherhood is supposed to be the central axis of
gender identity for adult women. In the Indian
cultural context, for instance, the body is seen as a
shared rather than a private resource. Being able to
produce a child out of her body is not only important
for a woman to achieve personal happiness, fulfill-
ment and self-esteem but also esteem/status within the
family and the treatment she will be meted out by
other family members. Inability to conceive and bear
a child often give rise to feelings of self-worthless-
ness, making her vulnerable to ill-treatment, violence
and in extreme cases, abandonment by the husband
and his family, and the loss of security of having a
roof over her head. It explains the ease with which
Indian women have adopted western biomedicine to
give shape to their traditional cultural gender identi-
ties primarily as mothers, or as mothers of sons
(through sex-selective abortions) [ibid.]. The enor-
mous familial and social pressure on women has
increased further with the availability of ARTs and
explains the increasingly large numbers of women,
ranging from the very young to the old who flock
infertility clinics, as observed during the empirical
research conducted by the first author (Gupta 2006).
Various studies done from a phenomenological
perspective on embodiment let women “speak their
bodies”, or “write their bodily experiences” (Benjamin
and Ha’elyon 2002), and in doing so explore how
women negotiate a sense of self in relation to their
bodies. We do not have bodies, but we are our bodies.
Although, for instance, infertile women think of their
bodies as machines, they also view their bodies as
integral to their selves and often talk about infertility
treatment as an invasion of the integrity of the self.
Despite their objectification as part of medical
procedures, women actively pursue their goals and
try to negotiate control over their reproductive
futures. They do not simply acquiesce to the medical
portrayals of themselves; rather, they respond actively
and strategically to achieve desired outcomes. They
work the system and try to push medical treatment in
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the direction they want it to go (Greil 2002). Beckers’
(2000) ethnography of infertile couples in the USA
demonstrates that resorting to ARTs is about taking
their lives in their own hands, to be like other
“normal” married women with a fulfilled desire for
children. This may involve receiving and donating
eggs. Therefore, some question the ban on egg
donation, viewing it as infringement upon women’s
rights to self-determination and discrimination against
women, for, if sperm donation is allowed and men are
paid for sperm, then why not egg donation, and why
shouldn’t women be paid for their ova? Certainly
when this ideal is coupled with the ideal of altruism,
that by making this choice they are also helping
another woman/couple to realise their dream, then
what is the problem? Should this not be seen as a new
form of solidarity between women—a new form of
“sisterhood”?
There are certain problems with the above reason-
ing. The arguments conflate sperm donation and egg
donation as though obtaining sperm and ova are
comparable procedures, which they are not. Women
are hyper-ovulated to stimulate the production of a
maximum number of ova and “egg harvesting” is
done under anesthesia—procedures which could be
risky for women’s health. In biomedicine the female
body is a factory within which women are labourers
under the supervision of physician-managers. Within
this factory model of reproduction it is the physician,
not the “woman in the body”, who is in control.
Women as producers of eggs, the raw material for
embryo research, as well as of children, fall under this
supervision (Martin 1987). They deliver their bodies
completely to the technology and to reproductive
scientists. Some even say they feel as though their
body belongs to someone else. In surrogacy, the
contracting couple and infertility specialists tempo-
rarily own a woman’s body. The woman is referred to
as a (gestational) carrier, not as a woman, leave alone
one who has a name, and her legal rights are
subservient to that of the genetic parents. Although
offered as a choice, the decision to sell body parts or
rent a uterus is seldom made on the basis of full
information regarding health hazards, or in absolute
freedom. It can be a considered decision, but the
decision is generally made in a context of limited
possibilities for self-expression or development, rising
unemployment, lack of financial resources, and in
circumstances not always self-created. Family obliga-
tions and poverty (joblessness and low income)
appear to be the two main driving forces behind the
transactions in reproductive body parts, including
surrogacy, in India (Ghosh 2006). Also, illustrative
is the recent case of a 22 year old orphan sold by an
orphanage owner to a 48 year old farmer and general
merchant in India under cover of “marriage” to be a
surrogate for him and his childless wife (Kumar
2005).
Therefore, those women who decide to leave
behind the image of being altruistic and self-sacrific-
ing beings, and themselves seek the path of selling
their body parts, are making themselves vulnerable to
other, newer forms of exploitation. Women have
become tools for the commercial interests of the
fertility business, where biomedicine and profit-
making come together, which play upon the altruistic
feelings of women—that women are or ought to be
more altruistic than men—and (mis)use this. Wom-
en’s reproductive labour is used to generate big profits
for these firms and their allies in the trade. For some
of those living on the margins of the global economy,
who are daily assaulted by disease, hunger and
premature death, and by degrading living and work
conditions, and for whom the experience of bodily
alienation is already a defining feature of their daily
lives, the possibility of selling an organ seems like an
act of empowerment, posits Scheper-Hughes (2001).
The configuration of women’s self-determination
versus objectification through reproductive technolo-
gies depends on several factors, which vary across the
world and in individual cases. Major factors are the
nature of the social and structural constraints under
which women live and the cultural values assigned to
the body and (some) body parts, although these
structures and values themselves appear to be shifting.
Shifting Boundaries: Unresolved Issues
for Bioethics
Through globalisation women around the world are
confronted with cosmopolitan biomedicine, which
confronts local understandings of the body and its
place within family and societal relations and local
cosmologies. By facilitating greater degrees of inter-
vention in the body, technology unsettles our knowl-
edge of what bodies are and puts to test our ability to
make moral judgements about how far science should
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be allowed to reconstruct the body. It raises funda-
mental questions regarding the ethics of the human
body and its parts being traded within processes of
globalisation, especially when, as George Soros (cited
in Scheper-Hughes 2001, 46) indicated “global social
values lag far behind global economics”.
What is particularly remarkable in the exchange/
trafficking in reproductive body parts is that cultural
ideas regarding the body as a temple, or as a holistic
entity have become eroded in favor of the “universal
codification” of the body as a machine with replace-
able parts. We are witnessing “the erasure of cultural
markers of the body as a sanctuary of human life and
its replacement with new markers of body parts as
objects that can be harvested for the sake of the
prolongation of life” (Truong 2001, 7), and also for
creation of new life as in technologically assisted
reproduction, through “the mother machine”, the
image used by Corea (1985).
Cultural and religious notions about the sacred-
ness, dignity (and integrity) of the body may
sometimes be translated into bioethics or public laws
devised by sovereign states relating to reproductive
technologies. Laws may pose barriers to the global
markets in body parts, but these have proven fragile,
partly due to the boundary-lessness of the Internet and
the ease of modern travel by which both bodies of
ideas and bodies of persons cross boundaries.
The unregulated trade in body parts within and
across countries raises issues concerning ownership
and contestation over body parts, which show
similarities with the trade in human bodies in previous
forms of slavery. The imaginary of slavery has
expanded from the labouring power to other utility
roles of the human body. This similarity lies in the
connection with production systems, despite the
changing ideological structures. In capitalist produc-
tion systems the cheap labour of some women is
exploited to produce for the world market; in
industrialised reproduction some women’s reproduc-
tive capacity is exploited to produce for the global
market. Women are now perceived as body-planta-
tions and living tissue and cell banks, by others and
sometimes also by themselves. Being reduced to
providers of resources for the medical profession
violates the human dignity of women (and men). We
need to question this biomedicine which offers us
dreams of immortality and imposes on us a relation-
ship to one’s body that is based on laying claims on
the body parts of others.
What ARTs introduce is a new kind of alienation
from one’s body while allowing for a new kind of
ownership. In Kantian terms, to regard one’s own
body as a property relation alienates one from the
very basis on which humans can be said to enjoy a
self, or to speak of one’s self at all. ARTs add new
aspects to old philosophical questions. What consti-
tutes human essence and the self in the context of
ARTs? What conception of human essence is pre-
supposed in the value of bodily integrity? Is the
concept of bodily integrity as a human right to be
extended to (aborted) foetuses, which can be used to
extract eggs, cells or other tissue? If the answer to the
latter question is positive, feminists may find them-
selves having to begin once again where they started,
to re-defend women’s right to abortion.
Developments in Western bio-medicine in our post-
modern times continually place before us challenges
which oblige us to seek ways to work towards shared
social values and ethical universals while keeping the
diversity of cultural contexts in mind. Women as
embodied beings give way to the alienation of
themselves from their bodies and its parts and
products. Their attempt to become subjects (“individ-
uals”) appears to be premised on their being reduced to
fragmented objects (“dividuals”). By losing “the whole
woman” in the relation between our own and others’
body parts, have we not gone too far with what we
wished to achieve with the second sexual revolution
ushered in by assisted reproduction technologies?
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